Valued Opinions or Opinionated Values: The Double Aggregation Problem (Now published in K. Basu, P. Pattanaik and K. Suzumura (eds.), Choice, Welfare and Development: Essays in Honour of Amartya Sen (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994).)

Kevin Roberts

STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series from Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE

Abstract: A new and powerful dictatorship result is presented. It is well known that in social choice problems, the negativism of the original Arrow result can be overcome by admitting information based on interpersonal comparisons. But what if individuals in society have different opinions about htese interpersonal comparisons> This paper shows that even in the most favourable circumstances, one individual's opinions must be dictatorial - social choice can be based upon an evaluation of gains and losses to different individuals but must be based upon one individual's opinion about those gains and lossses.

Date: 1992-11
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cep:stitep:253

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series from Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().