A Matching Model with Wage Announcement

Espen Moen ()

STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series from Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE

Abstract: I study a matching model where heterogeneous firms publicly announce wage offers. A Walrasian type of equilibrium is derived, and the concept of stability used to restrict the set of equilibria. It is shown that the equilibrium is always separable, with high productivity firms announcing strictly higher wages than low productivity firms. Furthermore, it is shown that the equilibrium is constrained efficient.

Date: 1995-04
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cep:stitep:280

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