The Governance of Exchanges: Members' Co-operatives Versus Outside Ownership

Oliver Hart and John Moore

STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series from Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE

Abstract: The paper compares co-operative governance structure to outside ownership. The distinction between the two lies in who has residual rights of control. It is found that a co-operative becomes relatively less efficient as the environment becomes more competitive, and the interests of members become more skewed. These ideas are applied to the governance of exchanges.

Date: 1996-03
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Journal Article: The Governance of Exchanges: Members' Cooperatives versus Outside Ownership (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cep:stitep:/1996/292

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