Banks as Buyers of Last Resort for Government Bonds?

Daniel Gros

No 4, EconPol Policy Brief from ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich

Abstract: One of the key remaining key issues for the completion of the Banking Union is the concentrated exposure of banks in many countries to their own sovereign. A number of contributions have argued that banks should be discouraged from holding too much government debt and in particular should be discouraged from holding too much debt of their own government (Andritzky et al., 2016, ASC, 2015 and Korte & Steffan, 2014). The key counter-argument is that banks should be allowed to buy large amounts of their own sovereign because in this way they can stabilise the market in a crisis. Visco (2015) argues: … tight concentration limits could create substantive difficulties in “crisis” times. They could be particularly disruptive for banks’ ability to act as shock absorbers in the event of sovereign stress…. This argument is mistaken, however. As explained below, there are two reasons why the act of a bank buying the bonds of its own national government does not have a large positive impact on bond prices.

Date: 2017
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