Evidence on the political principal-agent problem from voting on public finance for concert halls

Niklas Potrafke

No 164, ifo Working Paper Series from ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich

Abstract: Principal-agent problems can arise when preferences of voters are not aligned with preferences of political representatives. Often the consequence of the political principalagent problem is political catering to special interests. In this paper I provide examples of principal-agent problems regarding public spending. The examples concern construction or extension of concert halls in two German cities. Resistance to public funding for the concert halls was particularly strong in electoral districts with large constituencies on the left. The evidence indicates that political representatives were more bourgeois than their constituencies. In the cases studied asymmetric information did not prevail and voters were able to discipline their representatives through referenda that countered the results of voting by political representatives.

JEL-codes: D72 D78 H72 Z10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Evidence on the political principal-agent problem from voting on public finance for concert halls (2013)
Working Paper: Evidence on the Political Principal-Agent Problem from Voting on Public Finance for Concert Halls (2013)
Working Paper: Evidence on the political principal-agent problem from voting on public finance for concert halls (2013)
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