Fiscal Decentralization and Regional Disparity: A Panel Data Approach for OECD Countries
Christian Lessmann
No 25, ifo Working Paper Series from ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich
Abstract:
The advantages and disadvantages of public sector decentralization are widely discussed in economics and political science. While some authors argue that decentralization leads to an optimal provision of public services and a promotion of economic growth, others emphasize the dangers of competition associated with decentralization between subnational governments especially for redistributive reasons. These authors argue that poorer regions could not compete for mobile factors with the richer ones and, therefore, poor regions would get poorer and rich regions richer. This paper studies empirically the impact of fiscal decentralization on regional disparities using panel data for 17 OECD countries from 1980 to 2001. As the measurement of decentralization and regional disparity is one of the main difficulties of this research, both are discussed extensively and different measurement concepts are elaborated. The findings of this study are that a high degree of decentralization is connected with low regional disparities. Hence, poor regions have no disadvantages from decentralization, quite the contrary.
JEL-codes: H72 H77 R11 R50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/IfoWorkingPaper-25.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ifowps:_25
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in ifo Working Paper Series from ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().