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Electoral cycles in perceived corruption: International empirical evidence

Niklas Potrafke ()

No 277, ifo Working Paper Series from ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich

Abstract: Perceived corruption in the public sector is measured by the reversed Transparency International’s Perception of Corruption Index (CPI). The dataset includes around 100 democracies over the period 2012–2016, a sample for which the CPI is comparable across countries and over time. The results show that the reversed CPI was about 0.4 points higher in election years than in other years, indicating that perceived corruption in the public sector increased before elections. The effect is especially pronounced before early elections (1.0 points) compared to regular elections (0.4 points). Future research needs to investigate why perceived corruption in the public sector increased before elections.

Keywords: Perceived corruption; elections; political manipulation; panel data; democracies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 D72 H11 K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-law and nep-pol
Date: 2018
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Related works:
Journal Article: Electoral cycles in perceived corruption: International empirical evidence (2019) Downloads
Working Paper: Electoral Cycles in Perceived Corruption: International Empirical Evidence (2018) Downloads
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