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Preferences for Redistribution and International Migration

Ilpo Kauppinen () and Panu Poutvaara ()

No 283, ifo Working Paper Series from ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich

Abstract: The Tiebout hypothesis suggests that people who migrate from more to less redistributive countries are more negative towards redistribution than non-migrants. However, differences between migrants’ and non-migrants’ redistributive preferences might also reflect self-interest. We present a model in-corporating these competing mechanisms and test it using survey data on Danish emigrants and non-migrants. We find strong support for the Tiebout hypothesis among men, while women’s preference patterns are opposite to what the hypothesis predicts. Even though emigrants neither pay taxes nor receive benefits in their country of origin, they tend to support policies that would be beneficial for people like themselves.

Keywords: Migration; emigration; welfare state; redistribution; political preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D64 D72 F22 J61 H20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int, nep-mig and nep-pol
Date: 2019
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