EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Do Couples Bargain over Fertility? Evidence Based on Child Preference Data

Timo Hener

No 92, ifo Working Paper Series from ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich

Abstract: Empirical literature has found evidence in favour of household bargaining models. In contrast to earlier tests that are limited to assignable private goods, we use child preference data in order to extend the empirical evidence on household bargaining to public household goods. In the empirical analysis, we exploit the different theoretical predictions for couples with heterogeneous and homogeneous preferences derived from household models. Our results indicate that couples bargain over fertility. Furthermore, we find that the ability to commit to household resource allocations depends on the gender of the partner with higher preferences.

Keywords: Fertility; child preferences; intra-household allocation; bargaining; limited commitment. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 D13 J13 J18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/IfoWorkingPaper-92.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Do Couples Bargain over Fertility?: Evidence Based on Child Preference Data (2010) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ifowps:_92

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ifo Working Paper Series from ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().

 
Page updated 2019-04-12
Handle: RePEc:ces:ifowps:_92