Uninsured countercyclical risk: an aggregation result and application to optimal monetary policy
R. Braun and
Tomoyuki Nakajima
No CARF-F-182, CARF F-Series from Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo
Abstract:
We consider an incomplete markets economy with capital accumulation and endogenous labor supply. Individuals face countercyclical idiosyncratic labor and asset risk. We derive conditions under which the aggregate allocations and price system can be found by solving a representative agent problem. This result is applied to analyze the properties of an optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian economy with uninsured countercyclical individual risk. The optimal monetary policy that emerges from our incomplete markets economy is the same as the optimal monetary policy in a representative agent model with preference shocks. When price rigidity is the only friction the optimal monetary policy calls for stabilizing the in ation rate at zero.
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2009-10, Revised 2010-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-dge, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Related works:
Journal Article: UNINSURED COUNTERCYCLICAL RISK: AN AGGREGATION RESULT AND APPLICATION TO OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY (2012) 
Working Paper: Uninsured countercyclical risk: an aggregation result and application to optimal monetary policy (2011) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf182
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