Efficient Combinatorial Exchanges with Opt-Out Types (Revised version of CARF-F-258)(Published in the B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 19 (1), 2019.)

Hitoshi Matsushima

No CARF-F-294, CARF F-Series from Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo

Abstract: We investigate combinatorial exchanges as a generalization of auctions and bilateral trades, where multiple heterogeneous commodities are initially possessed not only by a central planner but also by participants. We assume private values, quasi-linearity, risk neutrality, and independent type distribution. Efficiency, Bayesian Incentive Compatibility, and Interim Individual Rationality in a type-dependent manner are required. We introduce a stability notion in the ex-ante term, namely marginal core. By assuming the presence of opt-out types for each player, we show a full characterization in that the central planner inevitably has a deficit if and only if the marginal core is non-empty.

Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2011-11, Revised 2012-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf294

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