EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments (Revised version of CARF-F-433)

Yutaka Kayaba, Hitoshi Matsushima and Tomohisa Toyama
Additional contact information
Yutaka Kayaba: University of Tokyo
Tomohisa Toyama: International Christian University

No CARF-F-466, CARF F-Series from Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo

Abstract: We experimentally examine repeated prisoner’s dilemma with random termination, in which monitoring is imperfect and private. Our estimation indicates that a significant proportion of the subjects follow generous tit-for-tat strategies, which are stochastic extensions of tit-for-tat. However, the observed retaliating policies are inconsistent with the generous tit-for-tat equilibrium behavior. Showing inconsistent behavior, subjects with low accuracy do not tend to retaliate more than those with high accuracy. Furthermore, subjects with low accuracy tend to retaliate considerably with lesser strength than that predicted by the equilibrium theory, while subjects with high accuracy tend to retaliate with more strength than that predicted by the equilibrium theory, or with strength almost equivalent to it.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
Date: 2019-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.carf.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/admin/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/F466.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf466

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CARF F-Series from Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2019-12-08
Handle: RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf466