Multi-period competitive cheap talk with very biased experts
Eric Schmidbauer ()
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Eric Schmidbauer: University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL
No 2016-04, Working Papers from University of Central Florida, Department of Economics
Each of n experts communicates with a principal about the privately observed quality of the expert's own project via cheap talk, with new independently drawn projects available each period until the principal adopts one. Even when experts are very biased in that they only receive a positive payoff if their own project is selected, we show that informative equilibria may exist, characterize the set of stationary equilibria, and nd the Pareto dominant symmetric equilibrium. Experts face a tradeoff between inducing acceptance now versus waiting for a better project should the game continue. When the future is more highly valued experts send more informative messages, increasing the average quality of an adopted project and resulting in a Pareto improvement, while communication is harmed and payoffs can decline when there is more competition between experts.
Keywords: cheap talk; multiple senders; competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D74 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mic, nep-mkt and nep-ppm
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