Regulatory Arbitrage and Economic Stability
Uluc Aysun () and
Sami Alpanda ()
No 2020-02, Working Papers from University of Central Florida, Department of Economics
This paper shows that national bank regulation can ensure nancial and economy stability only if business cycles are driven by domestic and non- nancial global shocks. If global nancial shocks are more important, by contrast, national regulatory policies can be destabilizing. These inferences are drawn from a two-country DSGE model with global banking, nancial regulation and the nancial accelerator mechanism. The results indicate that bank regulation suppresses the ampli cation e¤ects of the nancial accelerator mechanism when countries face domestic and non- nancial global shocks. When there is a global nancial shock, however, highly-regulated countries are more vulnerable to the ebbs and ows of global bank lending since their rms are more leveraged and externally funded. More generally, the results imply that the nancial trilemma is not binding in economies where domestic and non- nancial global shocks drive the business cycle.
Keywords: bank regulation; DSGE; nancial accelerator; global banks; nancial trilemma. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E32 E44 F33 F44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 56 Pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba, nep-dge, nep-fdg, nep-mac and nep-opm
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cfl:wpaper:2020-02ua
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