Distressed Banks, Distorted Decisions?
Gareth Anderson (),
Rebecca Riley and
Garry Young ()
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Gareth Anderson: University of Oxford
No 1908, Discussion Papers from Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM)
Exploiting differences in pre-crisis business banking relationships, we present evidence to suggest that restricted credit availability following the 2008 financial crisis increased the rate of business failure in the United Kingdom. But rather than "cleansing" the economy by accelerating the exit of the least productive businesses, we find that tighter credit conditions resulted in some businesses failing despite being more productive than their surviving competitors. We also find evidence that distressed banks protected highly leveraged, low productivity businesses from failure.
JEL-codes: D22 D24 G21 G30 L10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-eur
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Working Paper: Distressed banks, distorted decisions? (2019)
Working Paper: Distressed Banks, Distorted Decisions? (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cfm:wpaper:1908
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