Incentives to provide local public goods: fiscal federalism, Russian style

Ekaterina Zhuravskaya

No w0001, Working Papers from Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR)

Abstract: Based on a unique data set on Russian city budgets, this paper shows that revenue sharing between regional and local governments provides local governments with no incentive to increase tax base or provide public goods. Any change in local government’s own revenues is almost entirely offset by changes in shared revenues. This leads to governmental over-regulation of private businesses. It is shown that fiscal incentives are a determinant of the formation of private business and the efficiency of public goods provision. The Russian federalism is compared to the Chinese federalism, where fiscal incentives reputedly are stronger in many provinces.

Keywords: Federalism; Russia; Local government; Transition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 H41 H71 O57 P35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2000-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (213)

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http://www.cefir.ru/papers/WP1.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Incentives to provide local public goods: fiscal federalism, Russian style (2000)
Working Paper: Incentives to provide local public goods: fiscal federalism, Russian style (2000)
Working Paper: Incentives to Provide Local Public Goods: Fiscal Federalism, Russian Style (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0001

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