Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia

Irina Slinko (), Evgeny Yakovlev and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya

No w0031, Working Papers from Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR)

Abstract: How does regulatory capture affect growth? We construct measures of the political power of firms and regional regulatory capture using micro-level data on the preferential treatment of firms through regional laws and regulations in Russia during the period 1992-2000. Using these measures, we find that: 1) politically powerful firms perform better on average; 2) a high level of regulatory capture hurts the performance of firms that have no political connections and boosts the performance of politically connected firms; 3) capture adversely affects small business growth and the tax capacity of the state; 4) there is no evidence that capture affects aggregate growth.

Keywords: Regulatory capture; institutional subversion; Russia; redistribution; special interest politics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 P26 P27 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2003-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec, nep-geo and nep-tra
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (37)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia (2005)
Working Paper: Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia (2004)
Working Paper: Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia (2003)
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