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Cooperation and Personality

Eugenio Proto

CAGE Online Working Paper Series from Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE)

Abstract: Cooperating and trusting behavior may be explained by preferences over social outcomes (people care about others, are unselfish and helpful), or attitudes to work and social responsibilities (plans have to be carried out, norms have to be followed). If the first hypothesis is true, Agreeableness, reporting stated empathy for others, should matter most; if the second, higher score in traits expressing attitude to work, intrinsic motivation (Conscientiousness) should be correlated with cooperating behavior and trust. We find experimental support for the second hypothesis when subjects provide real mental effort in two treatments with identical task, differing by whether others' payment is affected.

Keywords: Personality Traits; Cooperation; Effort Provision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-hrm, nep-neu and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Cooperation and Personality (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Cooperation and Personality (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Cooperation and Personality (2014) Downloads
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