Immigration, fear of crime and public spending on security
Leandro Elia () and
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Massimiliano Ferraresi: European Commission, Joint Research Centre
CAGE Online Working Paper Series from Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE)
We explore the relation between immigration, crime and local government spending on security in Italian municipalities. We find that immigration increases the share of public resources devoted to police protection, particularly when migrants are culturally distant from the native population. We uncover a misalignment between perception and reality, as immigration increases fear of future crimes rather than the actual probability of being victim of a crime. We also demonstrate that immigration from culturally distant societies is associated with a deterioration in civic cooperation and interpersonal trust, which can affect perceptions of safety and the demand for police services.
Keywords: JEL Classification: H71; J15; D72; F52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur, nep-mig, nep-soc and nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cge:wacage:434
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