Subsidies and the Dynamics of Selection:Experimental Evidence from Indonesia's National Health Insurance

Abhijit Banerjee, Amy Finkelstein, Rema Hanna, Benjamin Olken, Arianna Ornaghi and Sudarno Sumarto ()
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Amy Finkelstein: MIT
Rema Hanna: Harvard University
Benjamin Olken: MIT
Arianna Ornaghi: University of Warwick

CAGE Online Working Paper Series from Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE)

Abstract: How can developing countries increase health insurance? We experimentally assessed three approaches that simple theory suggests could increase coverage and potentially reduce adverse selection: temporary price subsidies, registration assistance, and information. Temporary subsidies attracted lower-cost enrollees, in part by reducing strategic coverage timing. While subsidies were active, coverage increased more than eightfold, at no higher unit cost to the government; after subsidies ended, coverage remained twice as high, again at no higher cost. However, subsidies are not sufficient to achieve universal coverage: the most intensive intervention – a full one-year subsidy combined with registration assistance – resulted in only 30 percent enrollment.

Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-exp, nep-ias and nep-sea
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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/c ... 454-2020_ornaghi.pdf

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cge:wacage:454

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