Designing Information Provision Experiments
Christopher Roth and
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Ingar Haaland: University of Bergen and CESifo
Christopher Roth: University of Warwick, briq, CESifo, CEPR, CAGE Warwick
Johannes Wohlfart: Department of Economics and CEBI, University of Copenhagen, CESifo, Danish Finance Institute
CAGE Online Working Paper Series from Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE)
We review methodological questions relevant for the design of information provision experiments. We first provide a literature review of major areas in which information provision experiments are applied. We then outline key measurement challenges and design recommendations that may be of help for practitioners planning to conduct an information experiment. We discuss the measurement of subjective beliefs, including the role of incentives and ways to reduce measurement error. We also discuss the design of the information intervention, as well as the measurement of belief updating. Moreover, we describe ways to mitigate potential experimenter demand effects and numerical anchoring arising from the information treatment. Finally, we discuss typical effect sizes in information experiments.
Keywords: Experimental Design; Beliefs; Information; Obfuscation JEL Classification: C90; D83; D91; L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cge:wacage:484
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