Environmental Liability and Regulation: An Empirical Study of the French Institutional Division of Labour

Pierre Bentata () and Karim Barkat ()
Additional contact information
Karim Barkat: CERGAM-CAE, Aix-Marseille Université

No 98, CAE Working Papers from Aix-Marseille Université, CERGAM

Abstract: Reasons for the joint use of ex ante regulation and ex post liability to cope with environmental accidents have been a longstanding issue in law and economics literature. This article, which includes the first empirical study of the French environmental legal system, analyzes courts’ decisions when injurers complied with regulatory standards. The results support a general trend toward a clear division of labour between regulation and liability: when both are jointly used, liability encourages aspects of care that are difficult to regulate, especially human behaviour and organization within dangerous entities. An unexpected effect of liability is observed: judges are more severe with the most regulated firms and public agents compared to smaller, private actors. This might be interpreted as complementing regulation when enforcement of regulatory standards is thought to be weak.

Keywords: Regulation; Liability; Environmental Risk; Institutional Design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K13 K32 K41 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2012-04
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cgm:wpaper:98

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CAE Working Papers from Aix-Marseille Université, CERGAM Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mathieu Bédard ().