Determinants of relative bargaining power in monetary unions

Brigitte Granville and Dominik Nagly

No 47, Working Papers from Queen Mary, University of London, School of Business and Management, Centre for Globalisation Research

Abstract: This paper studies the bargaining power of the debtors versus the creditors in Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).

Keywords: Bargaining power; competitiveness; disagreement cost; European Monetary Union; internal devaluation; transfer union (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 E02 E42 E58 E61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec, nep-gth and nep-mac
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cgs:wpaper:47

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