Termination Charges in the International Parcel Market

Andreas Haller, Christian Jaag and Urs Trinkner

No 33, Working Papers from Swiss Economics

Abstract: This paper explains the potentially excessive termination charges and low quality levels in the international parcel market with a stylized game theoretic model. Within this model it is possible to elaborate the distortions currently in place. The model incorporates quality to account for empirical findings on consumer preferences which indicate that quality of service is a crucial issue in the international parcel market.

Keywords: International parcel market; Termination charges; Remuneration system (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L14 L87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind
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http://www.swiss-economics.ch/RePEc/files/0033HallerJaagTrinkner.pdf

Related works:
Chapter: Termination charges in the international parcel market (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chc:wpaper:0033

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