Former CEO Directors: Lingering CEOs or Valuable Resources?

Ruediger Fahlenbrach, Bernadette A. Minton and Carrie H. Pan
Additional contact information
Bernadette A. Minton: The Ohio State University
Carrie H. Pan: Santa Clara University

No 10-11, Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series from Swiss Finance Institute

Abstract: A firm is more likely to reappoint a former CEO to its board of directors after retirement the better is the firm's market-adjusted stock performance and the more powerful is the former CEO. Firms benefit from the presence of former CEOs on their board. Firms with former CEO directors have better accounting performance, higher asset growth and make more investments, controlling for selectivity. The relative performance-turnover sensitivity of the successor CEO is higher when the former CEO is a director. After extremely poor firm performance under their successors, former CEOs often return to the CEO position.

Keywords: CEO turnover; rehired CEO; former CEO; board of directors; relative performance evaluation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G14 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
Date: 2010-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Former CEO Directors: Lingering CEOs or Valuable Resources? (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp1011

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