Collateral, Central Bank Repos, and Systemic Arbitrage
Falko Fecht (),
Kjell Nyborg (),
Jörg Rocholl and
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Jörg Rocholl: ESMT European School of Management and Technology
Jiri Woschitz: University of Zurich
No 16-66, Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series from Swiss Finance Institute
Central banks are under increased scrutiny because of the rapid growth in, and composition of, their balance sheets. Therefore, understanding the processes that shape these balance sheets and their consequences is crucial. We contribute by studying an extensive dataset of banks’ liquidity uptake and pledged collateral in central bank repos. We document systemic arbitrage whereby banks funnel credit risk and low-quality collateral to the central bank. Weaker banks use lower quality collateral to demand disproportionately larger amounts of central bank money (liquidity). This holds both before and after the financial crisis and may contribute to financial fragility and fragmentation.
Keywords: Collateral; repo; systemic arbitrage; central bank; collateral policy; banks; liquidity; interbank market; financial stability; financial fragmentation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G12 G21 E42 E51 E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba, nep-eec, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Working Paper: Collateral, Central Bank Repos, and Systemic Arbitrage (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp1666
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