Asymmetric Price Competition on Hybrid Platforms: Theory and Evidence from Amazon

Luise Eisfeld, Jun Yan and Li Yu
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Luise Eisfeld: University of Lausanne
Jun Yan: Xiamen University
Li Yu: Liaoning University

No 26-62, Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series from Swiss Finance Institute

Abstract: We study how hybrid platform operation, in which a platform competes with third-party sellers while charging a commission on their sales, shapes pricing incentives. Our model identifies two channels induced by the ad valorem commission - revenue sharing and double markup - that generate asymmetric pricing behavior between the platform and third-party sellers. Using data from Amazon's U.S. marketplace, we find patterns consistent with the model's predictions: third-party prices respond modestly more strongly to third-party entry and exit than to Amazon entry and exit, and significantly more strongly than Amazon prices do to common commodity cost shocks.

Keywords: E-Commerce; Hybrid Platform; Online Pricing; Pass-Through (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 E3 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 79 pages
Date: 2026-09
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