What constitutes a convention? Implications for the coexistence of conventions
No WP 2004: 3, CMI Working Papers from CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Bergen, Norway
A model of repeated play of a coordination game, where stage games have a location in social space, and players receive noisy signals of the true location of their games, is reviewed. Sugden (1995) suggests that in such a model, there can be a stationary state of convention coexistence only if interaction is non-uniform across social space. This paper shows that an alternative definition of conventions, which links conventions to actions rather than expectations, permits convention coexistence when interaction is uniform. To assess robustness, the concept of a global mutant is introduced, to which certain states of coexistence are robust.
Keywords: Conventions; Coordination; game; Equilibrium; selection; JEL; classification:; C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: What constitutes a convention? Implications for the coexistence of conventions (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chm:wpaper:wp2004-3
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CMI Working Papers from CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Bergen, Norway Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Robert Sjursen ().