The effects of agrarian contracts of a governmental intervention into bonded labor in the western terai of Nepal
Magnus Hatlebakk ()
No WP 2006: 6, CMI Working Papers from CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Bergen, Norway
We study an effective intervention into a specific form of bonded labor. The intervention led to a shift in agrarian contracts, from bonded labor to sharecropping. By comparing the pre- and post-liberation contracts we evaluate theoretical models of agrarian contracts. We suggest three mechanisms that jointly explain why landlords offered bonded labor contracts pre-liberation. One mechanism we apply to define bonded labor in contrast to tied labor. The mechanism, where the outside option as casual labor is endogenously determined by the choice of long-term contract, implies a trade-off for the landlord between efficiency and redistribution of surplus.
Keywords: Tied; labor; Agrarian; institutions; Nepal (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J43 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chm:wpaper:wp2006-6
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