Elite behaviour and citizen mobilization
Ivar Kolstad and
No 8, CMI Working Papers from CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Bergen, Norway
This paper studies the relation between self-serving elite behaviour and citizen political participation. We use a fixed effects approach to analyze the association between portfolio investment in tax havens and voter turnout, using data from 213 parliamentary elections in 65 countries for the period 1998-2014. For well-functioning democracies, we find a positive relation between the use of tax havens and voter turnout, suggesting that self-serving elite behaviour is associated with citizen political mobilization rather than voter apathy. The estimated relationship is stronger in the period after the 2008 economic crisis, when elite behaviour was a particularly salient issue.
Keywords: Elites; citizens; portfolio investment; tax havens; voter turnout; political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chm:wpaper:wp2015-8
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