Anarchy, Groups, and Conflict: An Experiment on the Emergence of Protective Associations

Adam Smith (), David Skarbek () and Bart Wilson
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Adam Smith: Department of Economics, George Mason University

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: In this paper, we investigate the implications of the philosophical considerations presented in Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia, by examining group formation in a laboratory setting where subjects engage in both cooperative and conflictual interactions. We endow participants with a commodity used to generate earnings, plunder others, or protect against plunder. In our primary treatment, we allow participants to form groups to pool their resources. We conduct a baseline comparison treatment that does not allow group formation. We find that allowing subjects to organize themselves into groups does not lead to more cooperation and may in fact exacerbate tendencies for conflict.

Keywords: Nozickian protective associations; Conflict; Anarchy; Experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D60 D70 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Anarchy, groups, and conflict: an experiment on the emergence of protective associations (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:09-03

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