Strategic behavior in Schelling dynamics: A new result and experimental evidence

Juan Benito Ostolaza, Pablo Branas-Garz (pbg@ugr.es), Penelope Hernandez (penelope.hernandez@uv.es) and Juan Sanchis (juan.a.sanchis@uv.es)
Additional contact information
Pablo Branas-Garz: Departamento de Teoria e Historia Economica, Universidad de Granada, Spain and Economic Science Institute Affliate, Chapman University
Penelope Hernandez: Departamento de Analisis Economico y ERI-CES, Spain
Juan Sanchis: Departamento de Estructura Econ´omica y ERI-CES, Spain
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Pablo Brañas-Garza

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: In this paper we experimentally test Schelling’s (1971) segregation model and confirm the striking result of segregation. In addition, we extend Schelling’s model theoretically by adding strategic behavior and moving costs. We obtain a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which rational agents facing moving costs may find it optimal not to move (anticipating other participants’ movements). This equilibrium is far for full segregation. We run experiments for this extended Schelling model. We find that the percentage of strategic players dramatically increases with the cost of moving and that the degree of segregation depends on the distribution of rational subjects.

Keywords: Subgame perfect equilibrium; segregation; experimental games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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http://www.chapman.edu/ESI/wp/Branas-Garza_Strateg ... chellingDynamics.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic behaviour in Schelling dynamics: Theory and experimental evidence (2015)
Working Paper: Strategic behavior in Schelling dynamics: A new result and experimental evidence (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:11-14

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