Information Effects in Multi-Unit Dutch Auctions
Steven Gjerstad () and
Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute
This study compares bidding behavior in a multi-unit uniform-price descending price (Dutch) auction under four different information conditions. Bidders are either informed of the number of bidders in the auction, or know that it is one of two possible sizes; they also either know the number of units remaining for sale or are unaware of how many units have been taken by other bidders. We find that revealing group size decreases bids, and therefore revenue, if units remaining are not shown. When group size is unknown the price also falls if the number of units remaining is revealed. The most efficient and largest revenue outcome occurs when bidders are not provided information on either group size or units remaining.
Keywords: Experimental Economics; Auctions; Institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 D44 D02 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-exp
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:12-08
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