Too Many Cooks Spoil the Broth: How the tragedy of the anticommons emerges in organizations

Matthew McCarter (), Shirli Kopelman, Thomas Turk and Candace Ybarra
Additional contact information
Shirli Kopelman: University of Michigan
Candace Ybarra: Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University, USA

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: In organizations, conflict often revolves around commons resources because they are critical for influence, performance, and organizational survival. Research on property rights, territoriality, and social dilemmas suggests that to reduce such conflict, organizations should facilitate the (psychological) privatization of commons resources. We complement these three literatures by drawing from the legal, organizational, and social psychology literatures to model how psychologically privatizing organizational commons resources – to prevent a tragedy of the commons (an overuse problem) – can lead to the emergence of equivalently problematic tragedy in organizations: the tragedy of the anticommons (an underuse problem). Our model contributes to these literatures by conceptualizing a bottom-up behavioral process (in contrast to institutional allocation) of property distribution that leads to the emergence of the tragedy of the anticommons. The implications of this bottom-up behavioral process for property rights theory, territoriality theory, and the social dilemma paradigm are discussed.

Keywords: anticommons resource; commons resource; egocentrism; fairness; property rights; psychological ownership; territoriality; tragedy of the commons; tragedy of the anticommons (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.chapman.edu/research-and-institutions/e ... ter_TooManyCooks.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:12-14

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Megan Luetje ().