Gender Biases in Delegation
Teresa M. García-Muñoz () and
Praveen Kujal ()
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Eleonora Bottino: ING Direct Madrid, Spain
Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute
We explore gender biases towards delegation in a modified (delegation) dictator game. Under compulsory delegation and no (gender) revelation no significant gender differences are observed for choices made by principals. Male agents share little with the recipients, meanwhile, female (agents) are not responsive to the incentive scheme and return less to the dictator. However, a clear dichotomy in female behavior is observed under gender revelation. As principals, females behave similar to their male counterparts and appoint as agents those who return more to them. On the other hand, as agents’ females show greater redistributive concerns relative to their male counterparts in the early periods even though it is detrimental to them over time. This results in both male and female principals delegating more to male agents over time.
Keywords: Dictator game; delegation; gender (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J01 J16 J7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dem and nep-ltv
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:16-22
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