Equilibrium wage rigidity in directed search
Gabriele Camera () and
Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute
Matching frictions and downward wage rigidity emerge as equilibrium phenomena in a twosided labor market where firms sustain variable wage adjustment costs. Firms post wages to attract workers and matches are endogenous. Reducing the wage relative to the wage previously posted is costly to the firm, where the cost is proportional to the size of the proposed cut. Shocks to the firm’s profitability may yield an equilibrium wage above what the firm would offer absent proportional adjustment costs. Wage cuts can be partial or full, immediate or delayed, and are non-linear in the shock size. Importantly, wages are sticky even if firms have negligible costs for cutting wages.
Keywords: frictions; matching; sticky wages (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D40 E30 J30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-knm, nep-lma and nep-mac
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Journal Article: Equilibrium wage rigidity in directed search (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:18-04
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