Deciding to Delegate: On Distributional Consequences of Endogenous Delegation

Lara Ezquerra and Praveen Kujal
Additional contact information
Lara Ezquerra: Universitat de les Illes Balears

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: We allow for principals to self-select into delegating (or not) the allocation decision to an agent in a modified dictator game. The standard dictator game is obtained when they choose not to delegate. Nearly half the subjects choose to be a dictator and make the allocation themselves. Dictators thus obtained transfer lower amounts to receivers, relative to when the decision making is passed to an agent (or the standard dictator game). Subjects self-selecting into the role of a dictator give less relative to those that pass the allocation decision to an agent. Finally, the distributional consequences of delegating, or not, vary with less inequality obtained when the delegation decision is delegated.

JEL-codes: C9 D0 D63 D64 D9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-ltv
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/281/

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:19-22

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Megan Luetje ().