The Art of Concession in General Lotto Games
Rahul Chandan (),
Keith Paarporn (),
Mahnoosh Alizadeh () and
Jason Marden ()
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Rahul Chandan: University of California, Santa Barbara
Keith Paarporn: University of California, Santa Barbara
Mahnoosh Alizadeh: University of California, Santa Barbara
Jason Marden: University of California, Santa Barbara
Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute
Success in adversarial environments often requires investment into additional resources in order to improve oneâ€™s competitive position. But, can intentionally decreasing oneâ€™s own competitiveness ever provide strategic benefits in such settings? In this paper, we focus on characterizing the role of â€œconcessionsâ€ as a component of strategic decision making. Specifically, we investigate whether a player can gain an advantage by either conceding budgetary resources or conceding valuable prizes to an opponent. While one might naÂ¨Ä±vely assume that the player cannot, our work demonstrates that â€“ perhaps surprisingly â€“ concessions do offer strategic benefits when made correctly. In the context of General Lotto games, we first show that neither budgetary concessions nor value concessions can be advantageous to either player in a 1-vs.-1 scenario. However, in settings where two players compete against a common adversary, we find opportunities for one of the two players to improve her payoff by conceding a prize to the adversary. We provide a set of sufficient conditions under which such concessions exist.
Keywords: General Lotto; Colonel Blotto; game; system security; defense; strategic pre-commitment; concession (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D74 H56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-spo
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:21-24
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