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Choice Flexibility and Long-Run Cooperation

Gabriele Camera, Jaehong Kim and David Rojo Arjona
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Jaehong Kim: Xiamen University

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: Understanding how incentives and institutions help scaling up cooperation is important, especially when strategic uncertainty is considerable. Evidence suggests that this is challenging even when full cooperation is theoretically sustainable thanks to indefinite repetition. In a controlled social dilemma experiment, we show that adding partial cooperation choices to the usual binary choice environment can raise cooperation and efficiency. Under suitable incentives, partial cooperation choices enable individuals to cheaply signal their desire to cooperate, reducing strategic uncertainty. The insight is that richer choice sets can form the basis of a language meaningful for coordinating on cooperation.

Keywords: experiments; repeated games; social dilemmas; strategy estimation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C90 D03 E02 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dcm, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-gth
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