Match Stability with a Costly and Flexible Number of Positions

James Gilmore and David Porter
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James Gilmore: Chapman University

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: One of the objectives of two-sided matching mechanisms is to pair two groups of agents such that there is no incentive for pair deviation. The outcome of a match can significantly impact participants. While much of the existing research in this field addresses the matching with fixed quotas, this is not always applicable. We introduce the concept of slot stability, recognizing the potential motivation for organizations to modify their quotas after the match. We propose an algorithm designed to create stable and slot stable matches by employing flexible, endogenous quotas to address this issue.

Keywords: Matching; Stability; Flexible Quotas (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D02 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:23-10

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