Dictators and Lying Dictators: An Experimental Investigation of Preference Based-Group Biases in Chinese and American Interactions

Aaron Berman, Saika Cer Askin, Shapeng Jiang, David Porter and Jason Shachat
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Aaron Berman: California Institute of Technology
Saika Cer Askin: Chapman University, Economic Science Institute
Shapeng Jiang: Wuhan University
David Porter: Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: This study examines preference-based behavioral biases in social interactions between two distinct communities: students from Chapman University in the United States and Wuhan University in China. Using controlled experiments, participants interacted within or across communities in Dictator games. Two versions of the Dictator game were used: one where decisions were observable by both the experimenter and the recipient, and another where allocators could misreport outcomes with plausible deniability. Results revealed unexpected patterns, including similar allocation distributions across communities in the transparent task, and differing behaviors in the misreporting task, with Chapman allocators being more generous to out-group members and Wuhan allocators choosing more selfishly. The study challenges traditional theories of in-group favoritism and highlights the role of cultural differences and image concerns in decision-making. Findings contribute to understanding cross-cultural interactions, particularly in the context of increasing global connectivity.

Keywords: In-group bias; Dictator game; Lying; Social image (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D63 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cna, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-spo
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:25-12

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