Semi-Stationary Equilibrium in Leader-Follower Games

Ngo Long and Koji Shimomura

CIRANO Working Papers from CIRANO

Abstract: We show that in some leader-follower games, a steady-state equilibrium in quantities may exist only with non-stationary shadow prices. We call this type of equilibrium a semi-stationary steady state. Conclusions that are drawn on the assumption that a steady-state equilibrium has stationary shadow prices may turn out to be incorrect, because such a fully stationary steady state may not exist. Nous démontrons que dans certains jeux de leader-followers, un état stationnaire n'existe qu'avec des prix fictifs non-stationnaires. Ce type d'équilibre est nommé équilibre semi-stationnaire. Les conclusions basées sur l'hypothèse que les prix fictifs sont stationnaires peuvent s'avérer fausses.

Keywords: Leader-follower; dynamic games; Leader-follower; jeux dynamiques (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-02-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cir:cirwor:2000s-08

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