Protection, Lobbying, and Market Structure

Arye Hillman (), Ngo Long and Antoine Soubeyran

CIRANO Working Papers from CIRANO

Abstract: We analyze a model of lobbying by oligopolists who allocate resources between lobbying and internal cost-reducing activities. We ask the following questions: (i) if firms differ with respect to comparative advantage in lobbying, what is the equilibrium allocation of resources between lobbying and cost-reducing activities? (ii) can the possibility of lobbying reverse the profitability ranking among firms? (iii) under what condition is the conventional wisdom (that highly concentrated industries tend to obtain more protection) valid? On analyse un modèle de lobbying par des entrepreneurs qui allouent leur temps entre les activités de supervision. On donne des réponses aux questions suivantes: (i) quelles sont les allocations de ressources en équilibre? Le lobbying pourrait-il renverser l'ordre de rentabilité parmi les firmes? (iii) y a-t-il une corrélation entre le degré de concentration d'une industrie et la protection qu'elle obtient du gouvernement?

Keywords: Lobbying; oligopoly; protection; quota; Lobbying; oligopole; protection; quota (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-04-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2000s-12.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Protection, lobbying, and market structure (2001)
Working Paper: Protection, Lobbying, and Market Structure (1998)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cir:cirwor:2000s-12

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CIRANO Working Papers from CIRANO Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Webmaster ().