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Do CEOs Exercise Their Stock Options Earlier than Other Executives?

Paul Andre (), M. Martin Boyer () and Robert Gagné ()

CIRANO Working Papers from CIRANO

Abstract: This paper looks at the timing chosen by CEOs to exercise their stock options and to sell their shares of stock compared to the timing chosen by other top executives in the firm. We first present a model that predicts when CEOs should exercise their options and/or sell their shares, and when other top managers should. Using a tournament approach we find that other top executives should exercise their stock options later than the CEO. We test this model using an unique data set of Canadian companies from 1993 onward. Our results seem to support the theoretical model as non-CEO executives seem to exercise their stock options about a calendar year later than the CEO. Moreover, non-CEO executive a more likely to exercise when a new CEO has been appointed, confirming our tournament model results. Nous étudions dans cet article le moment choisi par le PDG d'une compagnie pour lever ses options ou vendre ses actions dans la compagnie comparativement au moment choisi par les autres hauts dirigeants de la compagnie. Nous présentons premièrement un modèle théorique de tournoi qui fait des prédictions quant au moment opportun pour le PDG et les autres dirigeants de lever leurs options et/ou de vendre leurs actions dans la compagnie. Nous montrons théoriquement dans un tel modèle de tournoi que les hauts dirigeants devraient lever leurs options après le PDG. Nous testons ce modèle en utilisant une base de données unique de compagnies canadiennes de 1993 à 1999. Nos résultats empiriques semblent supporter notre modèle théorique puisque les hauts dirigeants semblent lever leurs options un an plus tard que le PDG. De plus, les hauts dirigeants semblent plus enclins à lever leurs options lorsqu'un nouveau PDG vient d'être nommé, confirmant ainsi notre modèle de tournoi.

Keywords: CEO and Executive Compensation; Options; Timing of Exercised Options.; Contributions volontaires; pertes publiques; risque; ambiguïté; données expérimentales (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-07-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4) Track citations by RSS feed

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cir:cirwor:2002s-71

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