Trust and Reputation Building in E-Commerce

Claudia Keser

CIRANO Working Papers from CIRANO

Abstract: Transactions on online markets require a great deal of trust among anonymous trading partners. To mitigate some of the risks involved in anonymous transactions, several online market sites have implemented reputation management mechanisms that differ in structure and probably functionality. In a series of experiments, this study examines the impact of two simple reputation management mechanisms on the evolution of trust and trustworthiness in a repeated trust game among strangers. Les transactions par Internet exigent une confiance considérable entre les intervenants anonymes. Pour minimiser les risques associés à des opérations anonymes, les responsables de plusieurs marchés en ligne ont mis en place des mécanismes de gestion de réputation différant en structure et fonctionnalité. Dans une série d'expériences, cette étude évalue l'impact de deux mécanismes relativement simples sur la confiance et la coopération dans un jeu de confiance répété entre étrangers.

Keywords: Trust; Reputation; Experimental Economics; E-commerce; Mondialisation; commerce international; temps de travail; intégration économique (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-07-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2002s-75.pdf

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cir:cirwor:2002s-75

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CIRANO Working Papers from CIRANO Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Webmaster ().