Reinforcing Economic Incentives for Carbon Credits for Forests

Robert Cairns and Pierre Lasserre

CIRANO Working Papers from CIRANO

Abstract: Afforestation is a cost-effective way for some countries to meet part of their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol and its eventual extensions. Credits for carbon sequestration can be mediated through markets for emissions permits. Both new and old forests are subject to pestilence and fire, which are events that could release substantial, discrete quantities of carbon at irregular intervals. Permits markets, the use of green accounting, and insurance markets for sudden emmisions could increase the efficiency of the scheme and its attractiveness to potential participants. La plantation de forêts est une manière peu coûteuse pour certains pays de remplir leurs engagements à l'égard du Protocole de Kyoto et de ses extensions éventuelles. Les marchés pour les permis d'émissions peuvent s'assortir de crédits pour la séquestration de carbone. Tant les nouvelles que les anciennes forêts sont exposées aux incendies et aux invasions de parasites, qui peuvent se donner lieu à l'émission d'importantes quantités de gaz carbonique à intervalles irréguliers. Les marchés des permis et les marchés d'assurance, mis en ?uvre dans un cadre de comptabilité verte, peuvent rendre plus efficace et plus attrayant un système de crédits pour séquestration du carbone.

Keywords: carbon credit; forest; insurance; green accounting; accidental loss; crédits carbone; forêt; assurance; comptabilité verte; perte accidentelle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H00 Q28 Q29 Q38 Q39 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-03-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Reinforcing economic incentives for carbon credits for forests (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cir:cirwor:2004s-12

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