Nash Implementable Liability Rules for Judgement-Proof Injurers

Patrick Gonzalez ()

CIRANO Working Papers from CIRANO

Abstract: I provide a complete characterization of Nash implementable allocations of spending in prevention by judgement-proof injurers. This characterization is used to identify the optimal rule that allows for the maximum total spending in prevention. The optimal rule amounts to apply the negligence rule to the deep-pocket (or the victim), that is the injurer who responds the most to monetary incentives under the strict liability rule, and the strict liability rule to everybody else. Je développe une caractérisation complète des allocations de dépenses en prévention par des justiciables à la responsabilité limitée pouvant être mises en place en équilibre de Nash. Cette caractérisation est employée afin d'identifier la règle optimale permettant un maximum de dépenses en prévention. La règle optimale se résume à appliquer la règle de négligence au plus riche (le «deep-pocket» ou la «victime», selon l'interprétation), soit le justiciable qui répond le mieux aux incitations monétaires sous la règle de négligence, et la règle de responsabilité stricte à tous les autres.

Keywords: negligence rule; limited liability; multiple injurers; Nash implementation; règle de négligence; responsabilité limitée; multiples justiciables; mise en place en équilibre de Nash (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 H23 K13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-11-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-mic
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https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2004s-58.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Nash Implementable Liability Rules for Judgement-Proof Injurers (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cir:cirwor:2004s-58

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