The Build-up of Cooperative Behavior among Non-cooperative Agents

Hassan Benchekroun and Ngo Long

CIRANO Working Papers from CIRANO

Abstract: We develop a theoretical model in which each individual is, in some ultimate sense, motivated by purely egoistic satisfaction derived from the goods accruing to him, but there is an implicit social contract such that each performs duties for the others in a way that enhances the satisfaction of all. We introduce a state variable that acts as a proxy for social capital of trustworthiness and that we call the stock of cooperation. We show that noncooperative agents might condition their action on this state variable. Agents build-up the society's stock of cooperation and gradually overcome the free riding problem in a game of private contribution to a public good. We assume that there are neither penalties in the sense of trigger strategies, nor guilt and that each individual is rational. Nous développons un modèle théorique dans lequel les individus sont motivés par la satisfaction égoïste que leur procure l'accumulation de biens, mais où le contrat social incite chaque individu à travailler pour les autres afin d'accroître le bien-être collectif. Nous introduisons une variable d'état représentant le stock de capital social, ou « stock de coopération ». Nous démontrons que cette variable peut influencer les actions des agents non-coopératifs. Les agents accumulent le stock de coopération de la société et réussisent à règler de manière progressive le problème du passager clandestin pour un jeu de contributions privées dans un bien public. Nous supposons qu'il n'existe pas de stratégies de pénalité, de sentiment de culpabilité chez les individus et que chaque agent est rationnel.

Keywords: behavior rule; public goods; stock of cooperation; trust; biens public; confiance; règle de conduite; stock de coopération (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D60 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-10-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-gth, nep-pbe and nep-soc
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https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2006s-17.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: The build-up of cooperative behavior among non-cooperative selfish agents (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cir:cirwor:2006s-17

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