Bargaining with Linked Disagreement Points

Justin Leroux and Walid Marrouch ()

CIRANO Working Papers from CIRANO

Abstract: In the context of bilateral bargaining,we deal with issue linkage by developing a two-issue-two-players cooperative bargaining model. The axioms we propose focus on the role of the disagreement points. A family of bargaining rule stands out: the monotonic equal net ratio solutions. These solutions point to Pareto efficient outcomes such that the relative gains for players are equal across issues and reward the players for improving their bargaining power over each issue. We discuss our results in light of international trade and environmental negotiations, which are often put on the bargaining table in a linked fashion. Dans un contexte de négociations bilatérales, nous adressons la question de l'inter-connexion des sujets de négociation dans un modèle coopératif à deux-sujets-deux-agents. Les axiomes que nous proposons insistent sur le rôle des points de menace. Une famille de solutions ressort de l'analyse : les solutions monotones à taux nets identiques. Chacune de ces solutions préconise une issue Pareto efficace de sorte que les gains relatifs de chaque agent sont les mêmes pour les deux sujets de négociation. De plus, ces règles récompensent les agents pour des améliorations de leurs pouvoirs de négociation. Nous discutons nos résultats à la lumière des négociations de commerce international et environnementales, qui sont souvent amenées à la table de négociations de manière liée.

Keywords: Multi-issue bargaining; issue linkages; axiomatic solutions; disagree-ment point.; Négociations Multi-sujets; inter-connexion des sujets; solutions axiomatiques; point de Menace. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-02-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2011s-30.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Bargaining with Linked Disagreement Points (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cir:cirwor:2011s-30

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