Simultaneous Allocation of Bundled Goods Through Auctions: Assessing the Case for Joint Bidding

Daniel Rondeau, Pascal Courty and Maurice Doyon

CIRANO Working Papers from CIRANO

Abstract: We use the experimental method to study the costs and benefits of allowing joint bidding in simultaneous multi-unit first price sealed bid auctions for bundled goods. The research has immediate applications to the sale of public forest stands that arbor a mixture of species. Joint bidding and communication raise the prospect of higher allocative efficiency, but also of collusive bidding through a reduction in the number of bidders and a greater scope for the formation of bidding rings. However, we find that allowing joint bidding has a significant positive impact on efficiency and reduces collusion significantly. We also explore the robustness of the results to characteristics of the auction environment that are relevant to timber auctions.

Keywords: Timber auctions; forest industry; joint bidding; bidding rings; collusion; simultaneous auction; starting price; two bidder rule, (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D47 Q23 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-09-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-exp
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https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2013s-37.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Simultaneous Allocation of Bundled Goods through Auctions: Assessing the Case for Joint Bidding (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cir:cirwor:2013s-37

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